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Abstract
Objective: This paper studies the diﬀerences between controlled medical vocabularies that are designed as external artifacts and
the mental concepts that are inside users heads and used by users for reasoning, decision making, diagnosis, and treatment. Design:
The major theories of concept representations developed in cognitive science were reviewed, analyzed, and compared with the major
controlled medical vocabularies developed in medicine. Results: It was found that there are signiﬁcant mismatches between con-
trolled medical vocabularies that are designed as external artifacts and the mental concepts that are inside users heads and used by
users for reasoning, decision making, diagnosis, and treatment. Conclusions: Controlled medical vocabularies should be designed
with systematical considerations of the cognitive structures and processes of the users. Without such considerations, the designed
vocabularies will not be appropriate for people because they are hard to use, although they may or may not be appropriate for
machine processing.  2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Electronic medical records (EMRs) have the poten-
tial to make a highly signiﬁcant contribution to the
advancement of medicine and to the improvement of
the quality of health care. An ideal EMR would pro-
vide complete, accurate, and timely data, alerts, re-
minders, clinical decision supports, medical knowledge,
communications, and other aids at all points of care
for all health care professionals at all times in a way
the quality of health care can be dramatically im-
proved. To achieve these promised functions of EMR,
one necessary condition is a structured medical vo-
cabulary that serves as the foundation of EMR. Many
classiﬁcation systems have been proposed and imple-
mented [1–4]. However, no current system can capture
the full scope of medical knowledge. To address the
potential problems in the rapid growth of vocabulary
contents, Cimino [5] proposed a set of desiderata for
the next generation of standard, reusable, multipurpose
controlled vocabularies. On the scientiﬁc foundation
side, Chute and colleagues [6] argue that if we want to
achieve reliable outcomes and eﬃcient assessment of
data, we need to pay signiﬁcant attention to the basic
science of representing what we do to patients. Coiera
[1] made similar arguments on the important roles of
the cognitive foundation of medical concept represen-
tation. Along this line, Patel and Kushniruk [7] ex-
amined the cognitive issues of how users understand,
navigate, and communicate medical knowledge. In a
recent study published in this issue, Patel et al. [8]
showed that knowledge representations of medical
problems by physicians and patients were radically
diﬀerent. Such a mismatch could have an impact on
the nature of medical decision strategies used for pa-
tient care.
This paper examines the representational issues of
health concepts from a cognitive perspective. It starts
with a deﬁnition of representations. Based on this deﬁ-
nition, the diﬀerences between two types of concepts and
vocabularies are described. Then, seven cognitive theo-
ries of concepts and their implications for the repre-
sentations of health concepts are discussed. Finally, the
implications of expert–novice diﬀerences in concept
representations are discussed.
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2. Representations
A representation is something that stands for some-
thing else. It is a mapping between a represented world
(that which is to be represented) and a representing
world (that which does the representing). A represen-
tation must specify which aspects (objects, properties,
and relations) of the represented world are to be mod-
eled in the representing world, as well as how the rep-
resenting world carries out this mapping [9]. Table 1
shows a simple example of representations. In the rep-
resented world, there are two objects, two properties for
each object, and two relations between the two objects.
These two objects and their properties and relations can
be mapped to the representing world in diﬀerent ways.
In Representing World 1, they are represented by words
and numeric values, whereas in Representing World 2
they are represented by pictures. In Representing World
1, more knowledge is stored in internal representations
(memory in the head). For example, it is necessary to
retrieve numerical facts from memory to compare the
heights represented by numbers. In Representing World
2, more knowledge is available in external representa-
tions (pictures). For example, the weights can be com-
pared by visually inspecting the sizes of the two circles.
Under many circumstances, Representing World 2 is
more eﬃcient than Representing World 1 because less
mental eﬀort, though always true, typically leads to a
higher eﬃciency in the task performance.
Fig. 1 shows the relations between represented and
representing worlds for the complex medical domain.
The represented world is the world of all medical enti-
ties, objects, phenomena, events, procedures, etc. They
are the things to be represented. The representing world
can be the vocabularies invented by designers of classi-
ﬁcation systems. In this case, the things in the repre-
senting world are external to the human mind. They are
artifacts created by human beings to carve up and cat-
egorize the medical domain in a systematical way. The
representing world can also be the mental concepts in
the minds of users. In this case, the things in the rep-
resenting world are internal to the mind. They are the
concepts acquired by users through learning and mem-
orization, and they are the concepts that users use to
perform diagnoses, reasoning, decision making, problem
solving, treatment, and so on. The external representa-
tions of vocabularies and the internal representations of
mental concepts have diﬀerent properties that may aﬀect
the processing of information in a non-trivial way
[10–12].
The critical issue is the relation between the two
representing worlds: vocabularies in external classiﬁca-
tion systems and mental concepts inside the head of
Table 1
Representation
Represented world Representing
world 1
Representing
world 2
Objects Object 1,
Object 2
John, Eric
Properties Height 70 inches, 65
inches
Weight 180 LB, 140 LB
Relations Taller
Than(1, 2)
Relative numeric
values
Relative lengths
of bars
Heavier
Than(1, 2)
Relative numeric
values
Relative sizes of
circles
Fig. 1. The relations between represented and representing worlds. See text for details.
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users and used by users [7,13]. Let us consider the fol-
lowing four cases.
In the ﬁrst case, external vocabularies in classiﬁcation
systems are identical to the internal mental concepts in
users minds and the external vocabularies are copied
from the internal mental concepts. In this case, the
mental concepts are optimized for human processing.
However, the external vocabularies are unlikely to be
appropriate for machine processing (e.g., in EMR) be-
cause the regularities of external vocabularies reﬂect the
structures and constraints of mental representations that
are usually incompatible with machine representations.
One example of this is the multiple ways of coding the
same meaning by human users in a machine system (e.g.,
SNOMED International) that cannot easily ﬁgure out
that the multiple representations are equivalent in
meaning. One example described by Hammond and
Cimino [14] is the representation of ‘‘acute appendici-
tis’’, which can be coded as a single disease term, as a
combination of a modiﬁer (acute) and a disease term
(appendicitis), or as a combination of a modiﬁer (acute),
a morphology term (inﬂammation) and a topography
term (vermiform appendix). All of these representations
are correct, but there is no formal way in SNOMED to
know that their meanings are equivalent.
In the second case, the external vocabularies are
identical to the internal mental concepts, but the internal
mental concepts are copied from the external vocabu-
laries. In this case, the regularities of internal mental
concepts reﬂect the structures and constraints of exter-
nal vocabularies. The external vocabularies may be op-
timized and appropriate for machine processing.
However, it is not likely that they are also appropriate
for human processing, unless the structures of the hu-
man mind are systematically considered during the de-
sign of the external vocabularies. ICD-9 (International
Classiﬁcation, of Diseases, Ninth Edition) developed by
the World Health Organizaiton [15] is primarily a vo-
cabulary for the classiﬁcation of diseases for statistical
purposes. It is based on a strict hierarchy representation,
which does not match well with the structure of patient
information processed by human users in practice. If it is
used as a terminology system for the coding of patient
information, its artiﬁcial structure has to be learned and
memorized by human users.
In the third case, the external vocabularies are dif-
ferent from the internal mental concepts and they have
evolved independently. In this case, if the external vo-
cabularies are designed to optimize machine processing
and the internal mental concepts have evolved to opti-
mize mental processing, the success of the two combined
systems will depend on whether there is an eﬃcient
translation mechanism between the external vocabular-
ies and the internal mental concepts. If such a mecha-
nism does not exist, it would be very diﬃcult for
machines to process human mental concepts and for
human beings to process machine vocabularies, as in the
case of natural languages vs. programming languages.
Probably due to its obvious problem, none of the cur-
rent medical vocabulary systems fall into this category.
In the fourth case, the external vocabularies overlap
with the internal mental concepts and they have evolved
interactively. This is a realistic situation and it more or
less reﬂects the status of current classiﬁcation systems.
For example, users acquire mental concepts through
internalization of external vocabularies (e.g., through
textbooks or handbooks), which in turn might be de-
signed with some consideration of the cognitive prop-
erties of the mind. The problem with this situation is
that the external vocabularies and the internal mental
concepts are neither optimized for machines nor for
human minds. Most of the major systems in use today
fall into this category (e.g., Read, UMLS, SNOMED-
RT, etc.). Although it may not be impossible to optimize
a vocabulary for both machines and human minds, it
would be a long way to go because neither a vocabulary
for machines nor for human minds has been optimized
independently yet. Coiera [1] even argued that creating a
task-free or universal vocabulary for everything is
doomed to fail because terms are subjective, context-
dependent, purposive, and adaptive through evolution.
In the design of classiﬁcation systems of medical
vocabularies, we need to be careful about the structures
of the systems It has been shown that there is a strong
cognitive phenomenon called representational deter-
minism [10,16], which is that the format and structure of
a representation can guide, constrain, and, to some ex-
tent, determine the way the mind functions. If the
structure of a classiﬁcation system matches the users
cognitive properties, it can enhance the performance of
the user. But if there is a mismatch, the users perfor-
mance could be greatly hindered. As shown in Fig. 1,
many classiﬁcation schemes have been developed for
external medical vocabularies and many cognitive the-
ories have also been developed for mental concepts.
Currently, there is a lack of communication between
medical informatics practitioners who develop classiﬁ-
cation schemes and cognitive scientists who develop
cognitive theories. The rest of this paper brieﬂy reviews
the fundamental phenomenon and several cognitive
theories of mental concepts that could be potentially
considered by the designers of medical vocabularies.
3. Mental concepts
Mental concepts are important components of
human intelligence. A mental concept is the mental
representation of a category, which is a set of entities.
The process of forming a mental concept is called cat-
egorization. Without categorization, understanding,
reasoning, prediction, language, and other high level
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intelligent behaviors are impossible. Even in concrete
thinking situations, perceptual categorization based on
perceptual learning and frequency adaptation is still
needed for intelligent behaviors. If every apple is a dif-
ferent apple that is new to a creature, this creature
cannot exhibit intelligent behavior such as prediction
and expectation. In particular, concepts have the fol-
lowing functions. First, concepts provide classiﬁcations,
that is, we can decide whether an instance belongs to a
concept. Second, concepts provide understanding and
explanation. Once we know that an instance belongs to
a concept, we will know the properties of the instance.
For example, once we know that an object is an apple,
we know it is edible. Third, concepts support reasoning.
Given that Sam is a dog, we can answer the question ‘‘is
Sam a mammal?’’ The answer to this question can be
inferred from the relations between concepts. Fourth,
concepts provide organizations. Concepts are artifacts
that artiﬁcially carve the nature into organized chunks.
For example, we use limited number of color names to
divide the continuous color spectrum. Fifth, concepts
support communication. With the same representations
of concepts, people are able to communicate with each
other and learn indirect experience through communi-
cation.
Many theories have been developed for mental
concepts [17–24]. They basically fall into two categories
(see Fig. 1). The ﬁrst category includes theories for intra-
level concept representations. They are mainly con-
cerned with the internal representational structures of
individual concepts. Examples include the classical view,
the probabilistic view, the exemplar view, the theory-
based view, and the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA)
approach. The second category includes theories for
inter-level concept representations. They are mainly
concerned with the relations among concepts. Examples
include the hierarchical model, semantic net, frames and
schemas, connectionist models, construction-integration
theory, ACT* and ACT-R, and SOAR.
3.1. Intra-level concept theories
This subsection brieﬂy describes four intra-level
concept theories that are most relevant to medical con-
cepts.
3.1.1. Classical view
According to the classical view, a concept is deﬁned
by a set of necessary and suﬃcient features. For exam-
ple, triangle is deﬁned by three sides and a sum of 180
for the interior angles. Once we know that an object is a
triangle, then we know that it has three sides and the
sum of its interior angles is 180 (necessary features). On
the other hand, if we know that an object has three sides
and its interior angles add to 180 (suﬃcient features),
then we know that this object must be a triangle. The
classical theory of concept representation is based on
deﬁnitions of concepts that are deﬁned by necessary and
suﬃcient features, which are mathematically elegant
because they can be treated mathematically in a sys-
tematical way. One good aspect of this theory is that
features of concepts are nested in subset relations. For
example, features of bird are nested in those of robin
because robin is a subset of birds. Another good prop-
erty is that a concept is a representation of an entire
class, not a set of exemplars. However, this theory is too
restrictive to be a general theory. This theory does not
allow disjunctive concepts. For example, concept [(red,
square) or (blue, diamond)] has no deﬁning features.
And concept [(red, square, and large) or (blue, square,
and small)] has no jointly suﬃcient features. Examples
of disjunctive concepts include chair, furniture, game,
and many other concepts that are usually described as
family resemblance [25]. The principle of family resem-
blance is that members of a category tend to share
properties with each other but there is no set of prop-
erties that each and every member has to have. In other
words, diﬀerent members of the category tend to share
diﬀerent properties. The role of the classical view for
medical concepts is very limited because most medical
concepts are not well structured and many of them
cannot be represented by necessary and suﬃcient fea-
tures.
3.1.2. Probabilistic view
According to the probabilistic view [26], features of a
concept are salient ones that have a substantial proba-
bility of occurring in instances of the concept. If x has
some critical sum of weighted features of y, then x is a y.
In addition, the representation of a concept is an ab-
straction process in which a prototype is formed
through a dynamic process, not static descriptions of
features. For example, every feature of a concept has a
weight, whose value (between 0 and 1) can dynamically
change in response to the frequencies of encounters of
instances of the concept. One important point of this
view is the notion of prototypes [25]. A prototype is the
best example of a category; it possesses all characteristic
features of a category; and it is the central tendency and
average of the concept. In this view, a concept is orga-
nized around its prototype in terms of a set of features
with appropriate weights that are representative of the
prototypes of the concept This view can easily explain
the typicality eﬀect that a more prototypical instance
can be processed more eﬃciently [27,28]. For example,
people are faster to answer the question ‘‘is robin a
bird?’’ than ‘‘is chicken a bird?’’ because robin is a more
typical bird than chicken. However, this view cannot
easily explain context-dependent concepts. For example,
a harmonica is a typical musical instrument in the
context of a campﬁre but not a typical musical instru-
ment in a concert.
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3.1.3. Exemplar view
According to the exemplar view [29,30], the repre-
sentation of a concept consists of separate descriptions
of some of its exemplars (either instances or subsets). In
this view, classiﬁcation is based on similarity to a par-
ticular exemplar. People initially learn some examples of
a concept and then classify a new example based on how
similar it is to the already learned particular examples of
the concept. That is, a new instance elicits similar old
examples and it is assumed that similar instances belong
to the same category. For example, you might classify
one diagnosis as ﬂu because it reminds you of a case that
you know is ﬂu. As another example, the knowledge
that large birds are less likely to sing than small birds
may be derived from exemplars of small and large birds.
The exemplar view is more successful than the proba-
bilistic view, partially because it is more conservative
with respect to discarding potentially relevant informa-
tion (i.e., keeping detailed information without too
much abstraction. However, it also has problems. For
example, it cannot explain how concepts are created in
the ﬁrst place. That is, it does not have a mechanism for
the formation and creation of concepts [24,26].
3.1.4. Theory-based view
The theory-based view was developed in the studies
of how concepts are used in reasoning [18,20,23]. In this
view, the organization of concepts is knowledge-based
and theory-driven, and categorization is an inference
process, not a similarity judgment. For example, ‘‘chil-
dren, money, photo albums, and pets’’ belong to a
concept, which is ‘‘things to take out of ones house in
case of a ﬁre’’. In this example, classiﬁcation is not based
on a direct matching of properties of the concept with
those in the example, but rather requires that the ex-
ample have the right explanatory relationship to the
theory organizing the concept. One good feature of the
theory-based view is that it addresses the question of
why we have the concepts we have because a theory-
based concept is created by explanatory relations among
the instances of the concept. In addition, it provides a
natural way in which concepts may change, that is,
through the addition of new knowledge and theoretical
principles.
3.2. Inter-level concept theories
There are many theories for inter-level concepts. Only
three theories are described here.
3.2.1. Hierarchical model
According to the hierarchical model (see Fig. 2),
concepts are represented by nodes and links in a hier-
archical structure. Each node is an atom concept and the
link between two nodes is a subset relation called is-a,
part-whole relation called part-of, belonging relation
called has-a, or other relations. For example, robin is-a
bird and bird is-an animal. Here, we have three concepts
at three levels linked by two is-a relations. The hierar-
chical model is basically a taxonomy of things. Al-
though it captures some regularities of mental concepts,
it is not a very accurate model of how concepts are
represented in peoples mind. It cannot explain the
typicality eﬀect. For example, people are faster to an-
swer the question ‘‘is robin a bird?’’ than ‘‘is chicken a
bird?’’ because robin is a more typical bird than chicken.
The hierarchical model would predict that there is no
diﬀerence in response times for these two questions be-
cause both the robin and bird pair and the chicken and
bird pair have one is-a relation. The hierarchical model
cannot explain the reversal eﬀect, either. For example,
people are faster to answer the question ‘‘is chicken an
animal?’’ than ‘‘is chicken a bird?’’ even if the former
question spans three levels with two is-a relations
Fig. 2. Hierarchical model and semantic network model with spreading activition.
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whereas the latter one spans only two levels with one is-a
relation. The third eﬀect that cannot be explained by the
hierarchical model is the relatedness eﬀect. For example,
people are faster to answer the question ‘‘is bear a bird?’’
than ‘‘is bat a bird?’’, even if both questions span three
levels with two is-a relations. Descriptions of these three
eﬀects and a number of research studies can be found in
[26].
One related issue to the hierarchical model is the
notion of basic level concepts. In a concept hierarchy,
concepts are organized hierarchically: higher-level cate-
gories subsume lower-level categories and diﬀerent levels
of concepts have diﬀerent degrees of abstraction. Fig. 3
shows a hierarchical structure. One of the levels in Fig. 3
is called basic level, which is cognitively privileged. Basic
level concepts have the following properties [31]. (1)
They maximize information: superordinate level con-
cepts have too little information and subordinate level
concepts do not provide much more information. (2)
They are neither the most abstract nor the most speciﬁc,
but intermediate. (3) They are the ﬁrst to be learned. (4)
They are the objects that are naturally named. (5) They
are consistent across cultures. (6) The basic level is the
highest level in which the instances all share the same
parts, overall shape, and associated motor movements.
One obvious application of basic level concepts is to
design classiﬁcation systems of medical concepts such
that the organization, learning, retrieval, and display of
medical knowledge are centered on basic level concepts.
Coiera [1] made similar arguments with several medical
examples.
3.2.2. Semantic network with spreading activation
The semantic network model with spreading activa-
tion (see Fig. 2) is an extension of the hierarchical model
described above. Unlike the strict hierarchical model, it
has connections across more than two levels. In addi-
tion, its links have weights, with larger weights indicat-
ing more active links thus making the response times
shorter. With these two added features, the semantic
network model can explain the typicality eﬀect, the re-
versal eﬀect, and the relatedness eﬀect that cannot be
explained by the hierarchical model. The typicality eﬀect
can be explained by the stronger link (larger weight)
between bird and robin than between bird and chicken;
the reversal eﬀect can be explained by the direct link
between animal and chicken; and the relatedness eﬀect
can be explained by the strong links between bat and the
features of bird (has-wings and can-ﬂies). However, one
weakness of this model is that the weights of the links
cannot be automatically and systematically set.
3.2.3. Connectionist view
According to the connectionist view, concepts are not
represented in discrete, localist units such as features
and instances [32,33]. Rather, concepts are represented
as activation patterns in parallel and distributed net-
works of neuron-like units that connect to each other
and excite or inhibit each other through dynamic pro-
cesses. This view is closer to the underlying brain
mechanisms of concept processing than all other views
or models because its structures and mechanisms are
inspired by the structures and mechanisms of the neural
networks in the brain. In this view, concept is not just a
structure embedded in the connection strengths between
units; it is also the dynamic process of the network [22].
Concepts are no longer binary: an instance can belong
to a concept to some degree, and an instance can belong
to diﬀerent concepts in diﬀerent contexts. Concepts are
no longer static: they can be modiﬁed dynamically, they
are adaptive, and the acquisition process of concepts is
naturally accounted for by the learning mechanisms of
connectionist networks. The connectionist view has the
potential to become the dominant psychological theory
of concepts because it has better explanation and pre-
diction power. However, in implementations, one big
hurdle is that it is hard to build a connectionist system of
concepts that can easily scale up. In a typical training of
a connectionist network, the training set is usually
problem speciﬁc. For a real world problem, however,
there are typically numerous variations of a problem.
3.3. Expertise and concepts
Another cognitive issue of mental concept represen-
tation is the diﬀerent ways of representing and retrieving
concepts by experts and novices. A classic study by [34]
shows that novices used surface features (e.g., physical
shapes) to categorize problems while experts used un-
derlying principles (e.g., physics laws) to categorize
problems. Another study by Luria [35] showed that
people with formal schooling used abstract information
to categorize objects. For example, given hammer, log,
and saw, these people grouped hammer and saw to-
gether because they were both tools. However, people
with little formal schooling used practical thinking to
categorize objects: they grouped saw and log together
because saw was used to cut log. One implication of
these studies is that the design of classiﬁcation systems
of medical concepts should consider the diﬀerentFig. 3. Basic level concepts.
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thinking and reasoning styles of expert physicians and
less experienced medical students and residents, and
between physicians and patients. This point is made and
demonstrated clearly by Patel et al. [8], who showed that
knowledge representations of medical problems by
physicians and patients were radically diﬀerent, which
could potentially aﬀect the communication between
physicians and patients and the way medicine is prac-
ticed.
4. Discussion and conclusion
This paper discussed the diﬀerences between medical
vocabularies that are designed as external artifacts and
the mental concepts that are inside users heads. It ar-
gues that in order for controlled vocabularies to be more
usable for people, they should be designed with sys-
tematical considerations of the cognitive structures and
processes of the users. Without such considerations, the
designed vocabularies will not be appropriate for people
to use, although they may or may not be appropriate for
machine processing.
This paper described four views of mental represen-
tations of intra-level concepts and three views of mental
representations of inter-level concepts. Controlled
medical vocabularies currently being developed cover
not just simple singular concepts but also compound
concepts and full range of medical knowledge. Although
the cognitive theories are mainly for simple concepts,
they still have values in the design of complex vocabu-
laries. Other cognitive issues such as basic-level concepts
and expertise were also discussed. It is argued that the
properties of basic-level concepts and the expert–novice
diﬀerences in concept representations should be incor-
porated into the design of controlled medical vocabu-
laries.
Medical terminology is an issue of knowledge repre-
sentation in a complex domain. Knowledge representa-
tion has been a fundamental issue in all sub-areas of
cognitive science, including cognitive psychology, arti-
ﬁcial intelligence, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience,
anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and cognitive en-
gineering. Most of the empirical studies on knowledge
representation in cognitive science are basic science re-
search that uses simple tasks performed by either college
undergraduate students or everyday people. This can be
clearly seen from the cognitive studies of concepts re-
viewed in this paper. Although expert systems developed
in artiﬁcial intelligence research are for complex do-
mains such as medicine [36,37], they are typically not
directly supported by empirical studies. The develop-
ment of medical terminologies is facing the same prob-
lem. As stated earlier, without a deep understanding of
how medical concepts are created, used, and represented
by people and without strong and systematical empirical
backing, medical terminology systems cannot go very
far. This problem is especially critical to medical ter-
minology systems that are considered for EMR (e.g.,
SNOMED and READ). Clinicians who use EMR will
not likely use coding systems that do not match their
clinical language and are diﬃcult to use. Without ﬁrst
hand, prompt capture and coding of data into EMR by
clinicians, EMR will not be able to fulﬁll many of its
promised functions, as described at the beginning of this
paper. To develop a cognitively oriented medical ter-
minology system, knowledge and expertise are needed
both in medicine and cognitive science. This could be
potentially carried out by double experts who are spe-
cialized in both medicine and cognitive science. Such
double experts can be trained in a medical informatics
program that emphasizes both cognitive science as well
as traditional medical inforamtics.
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